Barrow, Darboe and Bensouda: the Paths to Victory in the Gambia's 2026 Presidential Election

The Gambia’s 2026 presidential election is shaping up as a fundamentally different contest from the election of 2021. Five years ago, Adama Barrow won decisively, receiving 457,519 votes, or 53.23 per cent.  Ousainu Darboe finished second with 238,253 votes, or 27.72 per cent, while Mamma Kandeh received 105,902 votes, or 12.32 per cent.

The political landscape has since changed. Barrow is seeking another mandate with a broader governing coalition around him.

Ousainu Darboe remains the most established opposition challenger.

Talib Bensouda has emerged as another significant opposition figure, with a particularly important base in the urban area of Kanifing.

The result is a three-way equation. And because The Gambia elects its president by plurality rather than requiring 50 per cent of the vote, that three-way split could be decisive.

The Gambia’s 1997 Constitution provides that a candidate must receive the highest number of valid votes to win on the first ballot.

A second ballot is required only if candidates are tied for the highest number of votes. That single rule explains much of the mathematics of the 2026 contest.

A candidate can win the presidency without receiving 50 per cent.

Suppose the result is: Barrow 42 per cent; Darboe 35 per cent; and Bensouda 20 per cent. Barrow wins.

Suppose instead: Barrow 40 per cent; Darboe 37 per cent; and Bensouda 21 per cent. Barrow still wins.

But if the opposition becomes consolidated: Darboe 42 per cent; Barrow 39 per cent; and Bensouda 16 per cent. Darboe wins.

This means that the central question of the 2026 presidential election is not simply whether Adama Barrow’s popularity has fallen since the 2021 presidential election. It is whether his support falls below the combined strength of one opposition challenger.

Adama Barrow’s starting position
Incumbent President Adama Barrow begins from a very strong electoral baseline. In the December 2021 presidential election, Barrow won more than half the national vote. He was exceptionally strong in the Upper River and parts of Central River. His political position has also changed since 2021 because of new alliances.

The Gambia Democratic Congress (GDC), led by Mamma Kandeh, is now part of the NPP-led governing coalition. That makes the 2021 GDC vote an important component of the 2026 calculation.

It would be simplistic, however, to assume that every Kandeh voter automatically becomes a Barrow voter. Political alliances transfer organisational networks more easily than they transfer individual voters.

The question is therefore how much of Kandeh’s previous support the governing coalition can actually mobilise for Barrow.

Adama Barrow’s strongest asset: the eastern vote
Incumbent President Adama Barrow’s greatest strategic advantage is geographical. In 2021 he obtained huge margins in the Upper River Region. He received roughly 84 per cent in Basse; 80.5 per cent in Kantora; 76.4 per cent in Tumana; 72 per cent in Wuli East; and 71.8 per cent in Wuli West.

If those margins remain broadly intact, Barrow begins every national calculation with a substantial bloc of votes that the opposition will find extremely difficult to dislodge. This means Barrow does not have to win every battleground.

Adama Barrow could lose several constituencies in the Lower River Region or the West Coast Region and still secure enough support nationally to win.

His greater vulnerability would be a broader decline in support across the western areas, particularly the West Coast Region and Kanifing, rather than an opposition breakthrough confined to a small number of constituencies.

In short, Barrow could afford to lose selected constituencies in the Lower River Region or West Coast Region without necessarily losing nationally, because losses in a limited number of constituencies would not, on their own, fundamentally alter the wider electoral balance.

The more significant risk would be a broad erosion of support across the western electoral belt, particularly in the West Coast Region and Kanifing.

A concentrated opposition breakthrough in a few constituencies would be one thing; a sustained decline in support across these larger and more electorally significant areas would represent a much wider shift in the national balance.

In other words, Adama Barrow’s key vulnerability is not simply losing individual constituencies, but losing substantial support across the western heartland (West Coast Region and Kanifing) of the electorate.

Adama Barrow’s winning formula
A plausible Barrow victory could look something like this: maintain overwhelming support in Upper River; maintain a strong advantage in Central River; remain above roughly 40 per cent in major West Coast areas; remain competitive in Kanifing; avoid catastrophic losses in Lower River and North Bank; and allow Darboe and Bensouda to divide the opposition vote.

Under such circumstances, Barrow could conceivably win with a national vote share in the low or mid-40s. For example, Barrow: 45-48 per cent; Darboe: 30-33 per cent; and Bensouda: 16-19 per cent would constitute a relatively comfortable Adama Barrow victory. This is a scenario, not a forecast.

The incumbent Adama Barrow’s vulnerability
There are, however, several reasons why the 2026 presidential election contest could be considerably tighter.

The August 2026 Gambia Participates poll found Adama Barrow on 32 per cent, Ousainu Darboe on 25 per cent and Talib Ahmed Bensouda on 19 per cent, with 17 per cent undecided. The poll also found that 51 per cent of respondents regarded Barrow as the candidate with the best chance of winning.

Those figures should not be treated as a prediction of the December 2026 presidential election result. Opinion polls measure sentiment at a particular moment. They do not automatically reproduce turnout, late campaign movements, tactical voting or constituency-level results.

But the August 2026 poll does demonstrate something important: President Barrow’s 2021 53 per cent is not a safe assumption for 2026. The incumbent president (Barrow) has to rebuild a coalition capable of producing a plurality.

For the benefit of the reader unfamiliar with some of these terms, in elections, a plurality occurs when a candidate or party receives more votes than any other individual alternative, but does not necessarily achieve an absolute majority (over 50% of the total votes cast).

Essentially, under a plurality rule, as we have in the Gambia, the rule is simply “whoever gets the most votes wins”. On the other hand, in a majority rule election, a majority vote strictly means that a candidate or a political party must receive more than 50% of the total votes cast (50% plus one) to win.

Recent public frustration in the Gambia over electricity supply is one example of a possible campaign vulnerability. Protests over prolonged power cuts in September 2026 brought visible criticism of the government, while Talib Bensouda publicly connected the anger to broader youth frustrations over economic opportunity and migration.

That does not necessarily translate into votes against President Barrow, but it shows that the incumbent enters the campaign with issues that his opponents can exploit.

UDP leader Ousainu Darboe’s challenge
Ousainu Darboe starts from a different position. His 2021 vote was only 27.72 per cent nationally, but that national number hides considerable geographical strength. Darboe was highly competitive in the Lower River Region and won some individual constituencies.

In Mansa Konko, for example, Ousainu Darboe was virtually tied with Barrow. He won Kiang West and was ahead in Kiang East. He was also strong in parts of the North Bank and the urban areas.

From my perspective, Ousainu Darboe’s problem is that he needs to convert this geographical competitiveness into a national coalition.

Ousainu Darboe’s winning formula
A realistic Darboe victory requires several things to happen simultaneously. First, he needs to win or substantially improve in Mansa Konko and the Lower River Region.

Second, he needs to become much more competitive in Kerewan/North Bank Region. Third, he needs a significant breakthrough in Kanifing. Fourth, Ousainu Darboe needs to win or nearly win several large West Coast constituencies.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, he needs to prevent Bensouda from taking too much of the urban opposition vote. This last point is critical.

Ousainu Darboe does not necessarily need Talib Bensouda to disappear. He needs Talib Bensouda’s vote to remain small enough, or sufficiently complementary, that Darboe can finish ahead of Barrow.

Which begs the question: Why does Brikama matter to Ousainu Darboe?

The West Coast Region contains a huge pool of voters. Several constituencies were already competitive in 2021. Brikama North actually gave Darboe approximately 43.9 per cent against Barrow’s 39.1 per cent.

Busumbala was almost tied, with Barrow around 41.4 per cent and Darboe around 39.6 per cent. Sanementereng gave Barrow about 44.9 per cent and Darboe about 38.2 per cent.

These are exactly the types of constituencies where a five-point or seven-point swing can change the national race. If Ousainu Darboe can convert several such constituencies from Barrow victories into Darboe victories, the national arithmetic changes rapidly.

Kanifing may be even more important
Kanifing is potentially the single most politically important urban area. Barrow won the area in 2021, but his margin was not uniform.

In 2021, Bakau actually voted for Darboe. The emergence of Talib Bensouda makes the area even more complicated because Bensouda’s political identity is closely associated with Kanifing.

For Darboe, the ideal scenario is to become the clear anti-Barrow candidate in Kanifing. For Barrow, the ideal scenario is for Darboe and Bensouda to divide the opposition vote. For Bensouda, the objective is to establish himself as the strongest alternative to the established political order. That makes Kanifing a three-way strategic contest.

Talib Bensouda’s dilemma
Talib Bensouda is the most difficult candidate to model. If he receives 15 per cent nationally, he may not be close to winning. But 15 per cent can still determine the winner.

If most of Talib Bensouda’s voters would otherwise have supported Darboe, Talib Bensouda could unintentionally help Barrow retain the presidency. But if Bensouda attracts voters who would otherwise have stayed home, or attracts people who would never have voted for Darboe, his (Bensouda’s) effect could be different.

Talib Bensouda could expand the opposition electorate rather than simply split it. That distinction, as far as I am concerned, is impossible to resolve from the available evidence.

The Talib Bensouda scenario
Suppose Talib Bensouda performs particularly strongly in Kanifing and Brikama. A result such as Barrow 40 per cent; Darboe 35 per cent; Bensouda 22 per cent would produce a Barrow victory despite the opposition candidates collectively receiving 57 per cent. That is the central paradox of the upcoming presidential election.

The combined opposition vote can exceed Adama Barrow’s vote by a considerable margin while Barrow still wins. But if Talib Bensouda’s voters strategically move toward Darboe, the result could become Darboe 42 per cent; Barrow 39 per cent; Bensouda 16 per cent and Darboe would win.

Opposition unity is therefore more important than almost anything else. The strategic question is not necessarily whether Darboe and Bensouda formally merge their organisations. They could cooperate electorally without creating a single political party. They could also remain separate while encouraging tactical voting in particular constituencies.

Or they could remain completely separate and compete for the same voters. Each arrangement produces a different mathematical result. If the opposition remains divided, Barrow has a significant structural advantage.

If Darboe becomes the clear anti-Barrow presidential candidate, the contest becomes much closer. If Bensouda overtakes Darboe as the principal urban opposition candidate, the entire model changes again.

Three possible national scenarios
Scenario One: Barrow consolidates the governing coalition. Under a favourable scenario for the incumbent: Barrow: 45-48 per cent; Darboe: 30-33 per cent; and Bensouda: 16-19 per cent.

Adama Barrow wins without needing to reproduce his 2021 53.23 per cent. The essential ingredients are strong eastern margins, sufficient West Coast support and a divided opposition.

Scenario Two: the race becomes genuinely competitive. A more difficult scenario for Barrow might produce: Barrow: 40-43 per cent; Darboe: 35-38 per cent; and Bensouda: 19-22 per cent.

Barrow could still win because Darboe and Bensouda remain divided. This is the scenario in which the incumbent is vulnerable but still has the advantage of the plurality system.

Scenario Three: Darboe consolidates the opposition. A Darboe breakthrough could look like: Darboe: 40-44 per cent; Barrow: 37-40 per cent; and Bensouda: 15-19 per cent. Darboe wins.

But achieving that outcome requires much more than general dissatisfaction with the government. It requires a specific geographical coalition.

Ousainu Darboe’s “magic number”
Darboe does not need to win Basse. He does not need to win every Central River constituency. He does not even need to dominate the entire country. Darboe’s path is more specific.

Darboe needs something close to: Upper River Region: accept a substantial Barrow defeat; Central River: reduce Adama Barrow’s margins; North Bank Region: win or become highly competitive; Lower River Region: win clearly; Brikama: win narrowly or remain very close; Kanifing: win or nearly win; Banjul: become competitive.

If that happens while Talib Bensouda’s vote remains contained, Darboe can potentially reach the high 30s or low 40s nationally.

Adama Barrow’s “magic number”
From my perspective, Adama Barrow’s path is simpler. He needs to preserve the eastern fortress. He needs to remain strong in Central River. He needs to keep Brikama above roughly 40 per cent. He needs to remain competitive in Kanifing.

And, most importantly, Barrow needs Darboe and Bensouda to remain separate enough that neither can consolidate the anti-Barrow vote. If those conditions hold, Barrow can lose several battlegrounds and still win the presidential election.

The role of the final voter register is equally important. The final register is another major variable.

The IEC recorded 212,095 supplementary registrations in 2026. It later removed 14,334 duplicate 2026 registrations while retaining the affected voters’ names in the 2021 register. A further 1,694 objections were submitted to Revising Courts.

This means the final electorate cannot responsibly be calculated by simply adding 212,095 to the 2021 register. The final figure will emerge after the Revising Court process and final administrative reconciliation.

More important than the national number will be the constituency-by-constituency distribution. If the biggest net increases occur in Brikama and Kanifing, the urban vote becomes even more important.

If growth is concentrated in Adama Barrow’s eastern strongholds, his existing geographical advantage becomes more valuable. This is why the final register is an electoral variable rather than merely an administrative statistic.

Turnout is the other unknown. The 2021 turnout was about 89.3 per cent. If the final 2026 electorate is around 1.16 million as I projected in my previous articles for modelling purposes, an 85 per cent turnout would produce about 986,000 votes.

At 80 per cent turnout, it would be about 928,000 votes. At 75 per cent turnout, about 870,000 votes. The absolute number matters, but the geographical composition of turnout matters even more.

A high turnout in Kanifing and Brikama can have a very different national effect from an equally high turnout in a smaller eastern constituency. Youth turnout is particularly worth watching because the IEC has reported a substantial number of younger people among the new registrants.

Which begs the question: What does the current evidence say? The available evidence does not justify declaring a winner before the campaign. The 2021 presidential election results give Adama Barrow the strongest starting position. The current political alliances also provide Adama Barrow with a broader governing coalition than the one with which he entered the 2021 presidential election.

The current polling, however, suggests that Barrow’s 2021 support should not simply be assumed to remain intact. The Gambia Participates’ August 2026 survey put Adama Barrow at 32 per cent, Darboe at 25 per cent and Bensouda at 19 per cent, with 17 per cent undecided.

The August 2026 poll also found that more respondents thought Adama Barrow had the best chance of winning than selected him as their intended candidate, illustrating the difference between electoral preference and perceived electability.

The governing party also faces issues that the opposition can use against it, including public dissatisfaction over electricity supply and wider concerns about economic opportunity and youth migration. Recent power-related protests demonstrated that these issues have moved beyond routine political criticism. None of this guarantees an opposition victory.

The three decisive variables
By the time Gambians vote on 5 December 2026, three variables are likely to determine the result.

First, the final voter register: The final number and geographical distribution of eligible voters will establish the real 2026 electoral map.

Second, opposition coordination: If Darboe and Bensouda divide the opposition electorate, Adama Barrow’s plurality advantage becomes powerful. If one emerges as the clear opposition vehicle, Barrow’s margin for error becomes much smaller.

Third, the West Coast Region: The outcome in Brikama and Kanifing could determine whether Adama Barrow’s eastern margins are enough to carry him to another term.

The bottom line is that the Gambia’s 2026 presidential election should not be described simply as a referendum on Adama Barrow. It is a contest between three different electoral strategies.

Barrow’s strategy is to preserve the governing coalition, maintain overwhelming eastern support, remain competitive in the West Coast Region and allow the opposition to divide itself.

Darboe’s strategy is to become the principal anti-Barrow candidate, win Lower River and parts of North Bank, break through in Kanifing and Brikama, and reduce Barrow’s eastern margins where possible.

Bensouda’s strategy is to turn urban and younger opposition sentiment into a distinct national coalition and establish himself as a credible alternative to both the incumbent and the traditional opposition.

The arithmetic favours Barrow while the opposition remains divided. Yet, the political momentum could favour the opposition if one challenger successfully consolidates the anti-incumbent vote.

And Bensouda is the variable that makes the final result especially difficult to model. The safest conclusion at this stage is therefore not that Barrow will win or that Darboe will win.

It is this: Adama Barrow has the easier mathematical path to victory, but his 2021 margin cannot be taken for granted. Ousainu Darboe has a credible route to the presidency, but only if he can convert his strength in the Lower River, North Bank and urban West Coast into a coherent national plurality. Talib Bensouda could either become the presidential candidate who breaks Adama Barrow’s coalition or the candidate whose independent campaign allows Barrow to win with less than half of the vote.

With nominations scheduled for 3rd to 14th November 2026, campaigning from 16th November to 3rd December 2026, and polling on 5th December 2026, the final weeks will determine which of these scenarios becomes reality.

Dr Ebrima Ceesay is a former Gambian journalist now academic based in the UK.